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S
ecuritization of loans and their sale to long-term investors has revolutionized many 
areas of finance: real estate, autos, consumer credit. But despite many efforts, it has 
not taken hold in community development financing. The obstacles to creating a 
secondary market for community development loans are similar to obstacles other 
markets faced: lack of data, standardization of documents and loan process, and loan volume. 
Other markets have managed to overcome these obstacles. Yet despite recent advances, such 
as the Community Reinvestment Fund’s issuance of rated securities in November 2004 and 
May 2006, the goal of a vibrant secondary market for community development loans seems 
as tantalizingly close today as it did nearly a decade ago, when a community development 
consultant wrote in Community Investments that “piece by piece, a secondary market is taking 
shape.” This development was in the “not-too-distant future. And, with the trend toward 
reduced public support, the sooner the better.”
The benefits of a secondary market were put this way by the National Task Force on 
Financing Affordable Housing in its 1992 report, “From Neighborhoods to the Capital 
Markets”:
The lack of a fully functioning secondary market for multifamily loans also works indi-
rectly to raise the costs of borrowing. Having to keep the loans in portfolio contributes 
to a mismatch between the terms on which lenders are willing to lend (shorter terms, 
variable rate) and those which are sustainable for this type of borrower (longer term, 
fixed rate). The resulting exposure of projects to interest-rate risk and refinancing uncer-
tainties means that fewer affordable housing projects are developed, and more run 
into trouble than would be the case if lenders were encouraged to lend on terms more 
appropriate to this type of project and borrower.
The need for more capital for community lending seems urgent. CFED researchers, in 
a late 1990s survey of revolving loan funds in Ohio, found that eighty-five of the fund 
managers believed that they needed more funding to pursue their mission. And the need for 
liquidity is particularly a problem for the larger and more successful Community Develop-
ment Financial Institutions (CDFIs). (For a more detailed discussion of how CDFIs access 
the secondary market in various ways, see the several articles that follow this article in this 
issue.) 
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The CDFI Fund commissioned a report to assess the feasibility of fostering a secondary 
market for community development loans. Although the Fund never released the report, a 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study cited an early version that indicated that 
very few CDFIs had actually tried to securitize their loans. The study argued that while 
“about one-third of the respondents have sold at least some loans they originated, CDFI 
participation in the secondary market for loans remains quite small.”
The GAO study, entitled “Community and Economic Development Loans: Securitiza-
tion Faces Significant Barriers,” also found that very few small business loans were secu-
ritized. From 1994 to 2001, only $6.2 billion of nonfederally guaranteed small business 
loans and $22 billion of SBA-guaranteed small business loans were securitized. This was a 
small percentage of the estimated $450 billion in outstanding small business loans held by 
commercial banks in June 2001.
This article attempts to understand this puzzle, where there seems to be great need, 
much talk, and many efforts, and yet still no fully functioning secondary market for commu-
nity development loans. To wrestle with that question, this article provides an overview of 
community development loan securitization (how it works and who the players are), looks at 
the early innovators in this field, and then traces more recent developments.
How It Works
While many of the articles in this issue deal with the selling of loans into a secondary 
market, a truly vibrant secondary market involves a process of securitization. Securitization 
turns loans into actual securities by taking existing loans on affordable housing, community 
facilities, or small businesses, or assets backed by their cash flows, and separating them into 
tranches that can be sold to investors. In this way, the lender, as the originator of the loan, 
gets a lump sum rather the interest and principal payments over the loan’s term. This allows 
the lender to re-lend the capital to new projects. When this market is working efficiently, it 
connects the lowest-cost capital to community projects, increases liquidity for lenders, and 
helps lenders and investors better manage their financial risk. 
Most transactions are not large enough to be securitized on their own (although for an 
interesting example of a large single-transaction securitization, see the David Bowie’s royal-
ties deal discussed in Robert Van Order’s article in this issue). Smaller transactions require an 
aggregator that pools the loans that can be sold to investors. The most widely known aggre-
gators are the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) for mortgages, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and Ginnie Mae. There are other aggregators, including Sallie Mae for educational 
loans, and many private aggregators, such as Bank of America or GE Capital. One of the 
leading aggregators for community development loans is the Minneapolis-based Commu-
nity Reinvestment Fund, which specializes in buying existing community development loans 
and selling them to investors (see Frank Altman’s article in this issue). 
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2003, 36.
4   Ibid., 8–9.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 19
When assets are securitized by an aggregator, the assets are transferred to another legal 
entity that divides the cash flow into senior and junior tranches. The financial institutions 
that transferred the assets to the new legal entity often retain the subordinate interest in the 
security. The senior interest is structured in a way that gives it first claim to cash flow and 
the underlying collateral in case of default. Investors are more comfortable with purchasing 
the senior interest as a security because the protections provided ensure that the risk of 
default is lower. (For more detail on the mechanics of how an originator prepares loans for 
a sale, see the articles by Judd Levy and Kenya Purnell and George Vine in this issue.) In 
significant ways, this technique has transformed banks and finance companies from being 
portfolio lenders into loan brokers, managing the relationships between borrowers and long-
term capital investors.
Securitization is an old technique, dating back hundreds of years, but its widespread 
application is a relatively recent phenomenon. Fannie Mae, which is synonymous with secu-
ritization, has been around since 1938, but its participation in the secondary market for 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) did not start in earnest until 1970. Loans other than real 
estate were not securitized until the 1980s (e.g., auto loans in 1985 and credit-card debt in 
1986). Securitization of MBS, and other asset-backed securities, or ABS, “has grown from a 
non-existent industry in 1970 to $6.6 trillion [in outstanding assets] as of the second quarter 
of 2003,” according to Cameron Cowan, partner in the law firm Orrick, Herrington, and 
Sutcliffe.
A vibrant and efficient secondary market has many advantages for all the participants 
in the transaction—borrower, lender, loan aggregator, and investor. For borrowers, it lowers 
their cost and can allow for more favorable loan terms. Lenders benefit greatly when their 
loans are more liquid. First and foremost, they get a capital infusion by selling old loans off 
their books. It also allows lenders to increase cash reserves, change lending terms, or diversify 
their portfolio by adjusting their concentration on certain geographies or types of borrowers. 
Finally, investors are attracted to MBS and ABS (compared to similar investments) through 
a combination of competitive yields, known risk parameters, flexibility of payment streams, 
and the desire to diversify their investment portfolios.
Even though there is not a deep, well-used secondary market for community develop-
ment loans, there have been many successful efforts of smaller securitizations for particular 
types of loans or assets, almost all of which were made possible by government guarantees 
(see Table 1).
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7    Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  “Asset  Securitization,”  November  1997,  4.  www.fdic.gov/news/news/finan-
cial/1999/FIL99109.pdf.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 20
Securitization Models and Lenders and Borrowers Involved
Model Lenders Borrowers
SBA 504 Program 
guaranteed
Certified Development 
Companies
For-profit businesses 
that have qualified for 
conventional loans.
SBA 7(a) guaranteed
Commercial banks, credit 
unions, small business 
lending companies and 
other nonbank lenders
For-profit small businesses 
that have demonstrated 
they could not obtain 
financing without the 7(a) 
program
SBA 7(a) unguaranteed
Commercial banks, credit 
unions, small business 
lending companies and 
other nonbank lenders
For-profit small businesses 
that have demonstrated 
they could not obtain 
financing without the 7(a) 
program
HUD Section 108 
guaranteed
CDBG grantees and their 
designated lenders
For-profit or nonprofit 
borrower
Community Reinvestment 
Fund
Nonprofit, for-profit, and 
government community 
economic development 
lenders
Local business, affordable 
housing, and community 
facilities borrowers
Obstacles to Creating a Secondary Market
Although the concept is relatively straightforward, in practice there are many obstacles to 
creating a secondary market—some inherent in developing any secondary market and others 
that might be unique to community development loan pools. To some degree, all pioneers 
of existing secondary markets had to find ways to standardize their lending practices and 
loan documents, collect and report consistent data, and overcome initial skepticism from 
the investor community. In the case of single-family mortgages, for example, many specific 
factors bear on an individual home’s value (location, quality, design, etc.). It took years 
to establish a successful track record and create confidence in the investor community to 
believe pools of single-family mortgages could be turned into a commodity investment. This 
evolution would not have taken place without the careful management and credit enhance-
ments from the federal government and GSEs. As important as building investor confidence 
was the work Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played in establishing uniformity for applications 
and loan documents. The GSEs introduced the standard mortgage application in 1973 and 
followed with standard mortgage documents for all states in 1975.
The creation of a secondary market for community development loans faces all the chal-
8    GAO, “Community and Economic Development Loans,” 27.
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lenges that the single-family mortgage market did (data, standardization, and interest from 
investors), but it has the added complications of low volume, thin spreads that make pricing 
difficult, and a business model that puts an emphasis on boutique loans with high levels of 
customer service that require intensive loan servicing. Furthermore, community develop-
ment loans are complicated and “may include public and private-sector involvement on 
a number of different levels,” according to former Federal Reserve Board Governor John 
P. LaWare in testimony on Capitol Hill. He explained that “a single loan to a program 
for the revitalization of a number of properties within a particular neighborhood could 
involve several borrowers having varying degrees of experience and financial capacity, and 
be supported by numerous state, federal, and private assistance programs.”0 With so many 
moving parts, it may be too difficult to make investors comfortable with community devel-
opment investments.
Overcoming Obstacles
One response to such a complicated underlying asset would be to provide investors with 
a credit enhancement that ensures the investor against losses stemming from the underper-
formance of the underlying assets the way Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did 
for single-family mortgages. “External credit enhancements rely on third parties to provide 
additional assurance of timely payment of principal and interest to investors,” according to 
the GAO report. “These enhancements can be governmentally provided (e.g., loan guaran-
tees) or privately provided (e.g., loan guarantee insurance or letters of credit).” In any case, 
the credit quality of the asset is based on the credit standing of the institution providing the 
guarantee. For example, pension fund investors do not need to understand the intricacies of 
the single-family mortgage market; they need to understand the credit quality of Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac.
Some internal credit enhancements are often arranged by the lender. One such structure 
is to have a senior and subordinate position where the senior securities have first claim on 
cash flow. Another is overcollateralization, where the value of the assets in the pool exceeds 
the value of the securities issued. And there are various ways to funnel cash flow into reserves 
as a way to give investors confidence of timely payments. Finally, lenders may be required 
to make a loan pool whole by substituting nonperforming loans with financially healthy 
ones. 
The Buy Side
Even under the best circumstances, however, there may be restrictions generated within 
the investor community that make securities backed by community development loans unat-
0   John P. LaWare, member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on 
Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, October 7, 
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tractive. “Pension funds,” according to Denise DiPasquale and Jean L. Cummings, “have a 
fiduciary responsibility, which results in a bias against investments that are perceived as risky 
relative to alternative investments.” Public pensions are regulated by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and private pension funds have similar guide-
lines. In addition to a regulatory environment that is hostile to community investments, 
DiPasquale and Cummings also find that pension funds and other institutional investors 
such as life insurance companies do not have the expertise to properly evaluate community 
development loan pools. If there is technical knowledge, it is often housed in the social-
investments branch of the organization, which does not have the same access to investment 
capital as the mainstream investment side of the organization.
Investors also favor large investments; they have tremendous pressure to keep transaction 
costs low because they are getting a relatively low rate of return for their investment. This 
fact creates problems for community development lenders because they are not set up to do 
a high-volume of business. Their clients, almost by definition, have been passed over by the 
high-volume traditional lending community. 
One answer to this problem is for loan aggregators to warehouse loans until they reach a 
threshold where they can pool and sell the loan securities. Warehousing, however, requires 
capital reserves. Loan aggregators, such as CRF, rely on socially motivated investors, program-
related investments (PRIs), and other capital reserves such as Equity Equivalent Investments 
(EQ2s) to generate sufficient capital reserves to warehouse loan pools. Because there are 
so many fixed costs with assembling a loan pool and making it attractive to investors (e.g., 
getting the pool rated by one of the credit-rating agencies), the loan pools have to be rela-
tively large. Frank Altman, president and CEO of CRF, estimates that the optimal pool size 
is above $100 million.
The Sale Side
There are also disincentives from the sell side of this market. The Economic Develop-
ment Administration conducted a pilot project with revolving loan funds to sell loans to the 
secondary market and found that “many RLFs [revolving loan funds] indicated they were 
not interested in securitization because they had no need to make new loans,” according to 
the study’s author, Kelly Robinson. Although this seems to fly in the face of the comments 
by many practitioners, it does speak to the possibility that there is a dearth of high-quality 
projects to securitize, particularly in specific rural or small markets. It also might be true that 
the RLFs have insufficient staff resources and expertise to maintain a high volume of loan 
underwriting. Put differently, it does not make sense to invest in the internal capacity to 
deliver loans to a pool, with all the added work that brings, if you are only completing a few 
loans per year.
Another issue is that many community lenders rely on keeping their loans on the books 
13   DiPasquale and Cummings, “Financing Multifamily Rental Housing,” 96.
14    Kelly  Robinson,  “Expanding  Capital  Resources  for  Economic  Development:  An  RLF  Demonstration,” 
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so they can collect ongoing servicing fees as a way to finance their organizations. This can be 
particularly important when the lender is trying to show strong cash flow as a way to estab-
lish its financial credibility. In the EAD study, however, “the RLF managers we interviewed 
that had experience with securitization did not describe origination and servicing fees as an 
important source of revenue for their organizations,” according to Robinson. 
Finally, many lenders or originators may not be motivated to securitize because the 
price is too high to attract investors to their largely low-interest loans. In other words, the 
discount—the difference between what is due on the loan portfolio and the market price that 
investors will pay—is too deep. There are at least two reasons why investors might demand 
a discount on community development securities: (1) the underlying loans may be below 
market rate (and therefore below their other investment options such as Treasury notes); 
and (2) the underlying assets (e.g., small businesses in low-income neighborhoods) are risky. 
Robinson estimated that the gross discount was around 10 percent on the 115 loans he exam-
ined in the EAD demonstration project. 
Early Securitization Innovators
There never has been national leadership from one of the GSEs, HUD, or some other 
agency on community development securitization. In this absence, a number of smaller 
securitization experiments around the country were focused on a region or asset type. Early 
efforts by community development lenders to access institutional capital got their start 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. The efforts were led by lender consortia such as Commu-
nity Preservation Corporation (CPC) in New York City, Savings Associations Mortgage 
Company (SAMCO) and the California Community Reinvestment Corporation (CCRC) 
in California, and Community Investment Corporation (CIC) in Chicago. These isolated 
regional efforts grew up alongside more national efforts to actually securitize specific types 
of loans, such as co-op loans securitized by a subsidiary of the National Cooperative Bank 
(NCB), or small business loans that were securitized with help from the Small Business   
Administration (SBA). 
CPC was an early leader in establishing a secondary market for mortgages through private 
placements to the New York City Employees Retirement System. The State of New York 
Mortgage Agency (SONYMA) provided credit enhancement for CPC loans. “Each CPC 
loan has a 100-percent mortgage guarantee backed by SONYMA’s extensive reserves (not 
the full faith and credit of the state of New York),” according to the GAO report “Expanding 
Capital.”  “These  reserves  accrue  annually  through  a  special  surtax  on  all  commercial 
mortgage loans.” (For more on CPC’s secondary market activities, see John McCarthy’s 
article in this issue.) CPC has also partnered with the New York City Teachers Retirement 
15   Ibid., 23.
16   Ibid., 25.
17    GAO,  “Housing  Finance:  Expanding  Housing  Finance:  Expanding  Capital  for  Affordable  Multifamily 
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System, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, the United Methodist Church, and   
Fannie Mae.
The creation of the Community Reinvestment Fund in 1989 and its growth through the 
1990s represented a major advancement in the effort to create a vibrant secondary market for 
community development loans. CRF has purchased more than $300 million in community 
development loans from over one hundred lending organizations located in almost half the 
states in the country, and, as described later in this article, has more recently issued rated 
securities backed by some of these loans.
“CRF has begun to harness the power of markets to organize disparate development 
lenders,” according to CRF president and CEO, Frank Altman. “The secondary market struc-
ture not only enables development lenders to tap the institutional capital markets, but it also 
fundamentally changes the ways in which these lenders view themselves. The participants in 
CRF’s secondary market no longer view government grants as the sole source of capital in 
their development loans. They will be able to sell them to private investors and thereby diver-
sify the sources of capital on which they rely to fund new economic development loans.” 
Altman stressed that “we must increasingly regard federal assistance as a catalyst or incen-
tive for private-sector investment.” These efforts translate into finding “ways to improve the 
productivity of each dollar,” he said.
NeighborWorks, a national network of affordable community development organiza-
tions, also has been a significant player in the inchoate efforts to securitize community devel-
opment loans. Its subsidiary, Neighborhood Housing Services of America (NHSA), started 
securitizing CDBG loans in 1974. NHSA has operated “a specialized secondary market 
created to replenish the revolving loan funds and capital pools of local NeighborWorks 
organizations.” By 2004, NHSA had purchased more than $650 million in loans from local 
NeighborWorks organizations and their local lending partners.0
NCB transacted the first securitization of co-op loans in 1986. Testifying before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Bradford T. Nordholm, president of the Cooperative Funding 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the NCB, said his organization had continued to innovate 
with securitization by completing the first securitization of cooperatively owned mobile 
home park mortgages in 1992. In 1993, it “successfully completed the first-ever securitization 
of affordable housing mortgages, the Mortgage Investment in Low-Income Communities 
Security (MILC), a pioneering effort to increase the flow of capital into affordable housing 
nationwide applauded by HUD Secretary [Henry] Cisneros.”
Nordholm was also successful in securitizing small co-op business loans. Testifying to 
Congress in the early 1990s, he observed that “most types of small business credit are begin-
ning to be securitized—revolving lines backed by receivables and inventory, intermediate-
18   http://www.communityp.com/index.php?sec=history&page=mortgageinsurance.
19   Frank Altman, president of CRF, testimony before the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Economic 
Development—Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, February 22, 1995.
20   NeighborWorks Annual Report 2004, 26–28.
21   Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, September 9, 1993.term loans and leases backed by equipment and longer-term real estate loans.” Nordholm 
went on to point out that “efficient conduits must develop in order to facilitate securitiza-
tion, conduits that can deliver a minimum of $10 million to $25 million, preferably $100 
million of homogeneous financial assets, with good performance statistics on both the ulti-
mate borrowers, conduit and servicer.” 
Yet more than a decade later, very few small business loans have been securitized, and 
the ones that are usually have the financial backing of the SBA. SBA began securitizing 
small-business loans in 1985, “when it first allowed depository institutions to pool and sell 
the guaranteed portion of their SBA loans,” according to the EAD report. “This was similar 
to the original ‘pass through’ on Fannie Mae guaranteed mortgages.” In the end, however, 
SBA may not be especially helpful in setting precedents for securitizing community devel-
opment loans for the following reasons: (1) SBA underwriting is highly standardized, which 
provides high volume; (2) the loans are made by private banks at near-market interest rates, 
which are higher than most community development businesses could afford; and (3) most 
of the loans carry SBA’s guarantee.
Early Efforts to Bring in the GSEs
In the 1990s, both the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise 
Foundation made efforts to partner with the housing GSEs to securitize affordable housing 
mortgages. LISC’s subsidiary, the Local Initiatives Managed Assets Corporation (LIMAC), 
partnered with Freddie Mac in 1991, but the program was suspended after two years with 
only one transaction completed (eight existing mortgages totaling $4.6 million). A subsidiary 
of Enterprise, Enterprise Mortgage Investments (EMI), partnered with Fannie Mae in 1994. 
Both partnerships received funding from the National Community Development Initiative 
(NCDI), which enlisted Jean Cummings and Denise DiPasquale to do an analysis of the 
programs, which were published in HUD’s Cityscape in 1998.
The stated goal of the LIMAC/Freddie partnership was to provide “a missing piece in the 
housing puzzle.” The partnership planned to “target community development corporations 
(CDCs) and small banks that would not normally work with Freddie Mac.” LIMAC would 
buy loans from approved Freddie Mac multifamily seller/servicers. They would pool the 
mortgages and swap the pools for Freddie Mac MBSs, which could be sold to institutional 
investors. There was a risk-sharing arrangement where LIMAC and the originating lender 
had the top 20 percent of losses and Freddie Mac would share the remaining 80 percent with 
the lender. LIMAC had to assemble the loans, which may have required warehousing. And 
lenders could retain servicing and earn a fee. 
The EMI/Fannie Mae program was different in that EMI was the originator, under-
22   October 7, 1993, Bradford T. Nordholm, president, Cooperative Funding Corporation.
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
23   Robinson, “Expanding Capital Resources,” 9.
24   “Developing a Secondary Market for Affordable Rental Housing: Lessons from the LIMAC/Freddie Mac and 
EMI/Fannie Mae Programs,” Cityscape 4: (1998).
25   Ibid., 25.
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCOwriter, and servicer of the loans. Fannie was the investor, funding the mortgages. The EMI/
Fannie program also differed in that it allowed for other investors. For example, the United 
Methodist Church bought $10 million in Fannie Mae MBSs through the program. Initially, 
according to Cummings and DiPasquale, “the program was to focus on long-term, permanent 
mortgages for smaller, central city, multifamily LIHTC [Low-Income Housing Tax Credit] 
projects being developed by CDCs and other nonprofit organizations—a market segment 
that program participants felt was underserved.” 
There was also a risk-sharing arrangement where EMI took the first 5 percent of loss 
and shared the remaining loss with Fannie Mae, although EMI’s share of losses was not to 
exceed 20 percent overall. The EMI/Fannie Mae program got a late start because of lengthy 
negotiations over underwriting and what some saw as overly burdensome Fannie Mae docu-
mentation. 
In the end, these two programs did not accomplish their goals, but they did provide 
important insight into how the GSEs could be incorporated into a community develop-
ment secondary market. And although the programs were different, they had some common 
themes of what did and did not work. For example, both were delayed in their rollout 
because the aggregators (EMI and LIMAC) had substantial differences with their GSE part-
ners over what constituted a risk in the loan and how to underwrite and price the transac-
tion. These divergent views created substantial back-and-forth negotiations that drained time 
and resources. The transactions also required a considerable amount of extra work for 
borrowers, and according to Cummings and DiPasquale, “More than one potential lender 
dropped out of the program because of the amount of documentation required.” 
It was possible to set the fees for part of the process up front, so the borrowers knew how 
much they would pay in points and rate to participate in the program. But Freddie Mac’s 
guarantee was not priced until the end of the transaction in what was termed Freddie Mac’s 
“black box.” “This uncertainty overshadowed every step of the negotiations,” according to 
Cummings and DiPasquale. “When the final price was set, both LIMAC and the lender felt 
that the price was too high, and the investor subsequently took a cut in its return to make 
the transaction feasible.” 
A Changing Political Environment for Community Development
An important change occurred in the political climate in Washington over commu-
nity development policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There seemed to be a growing 
consensus across the political spectrum that low-income communities were better off when 
a network of community groups, local and state governments, and elements of the private 
sector worked together to build housing and provide credit and social services. 
Unlike previous antipoverty programs that produced such rancorous debates, the legisla-
tive deliberations for the new system redrew the battle lines in often unpredictable ways. 
26   Ibid., 26.
27   Ibid.
28   Ibid., 29.
29   Ibid., 31.
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCOConsider how the conservative Republican HUD Secretary, Jack Kemp, lobbied his liberal 
colleagues strenuously to reauthorize the LIHTC program. He urged liberals on the House 
Ways and Means Committee to “rise above the left-right debate and find consensus as to 
what our Nation can do to fight poverty.”0 The consensus he referred to was use of public-
private partnerships to deliver social services. Kemp went on to praise both liberals and 
conservatives on the committee for their “willingness to walk away from ideology.” Some 
of this same rhetoric was present in the early 1990s debates over creating a secondary market 
for community development loans. A significant difference, however, was that community 
development finance advocates were not as successful as affordable housing advocates in 
securing federal funds to help create a secondary market of community development loans.
1992–1995: A Burst of Creativity at the Federal Level
In terms of building a secondary market, the developments leading up to 1993 tended 
to be small efforts, but starting that year there was a flurry of proposals at the national 
level. They included: (1) an effort by HUD to create a national credit enhancer on the 
foundation of FHA, the Federal Housing Corporation (FHC); (2) the FHA/State Housing 
Finance Agency Risk Share program; (3) new guidelines for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
that directed them to buy more affordable housing mortgages; and (4) the Riegle Act of 
1994, which helped foster community development finance and, at one point, contained a 
provision to create a new GSE for small business loans. Many of the proposals were gener-
ated by staff in the Clinton administration, and many of the same proposals were killed by 
the Republican majority in Congress after 1994.
1. FHC 
In 1994–95, HUD put forth a proposal to “reinvent” FHA to be an organization that 
continued its traditional work but expanded into new areas of community development 
finance. This new organization, to be called the Federal Housing Corporation (FHC), would 
have combined an “entrepreneurial, market-driven mode of operation with a public-purpose 
mission and mind-set,” according to Nicolas Retsinas, the HUD Undersecretary in charge 
of the proposed change. The FHC “would continue to run the FHA single-family product 
mix,” but it might also “experiment with pioneering mortgage products.”
Retsinas observed that many lenders “would like to increase their community reinvest-
ment lending but cannot afford to tie up their capital in multiyear loans.” Perhaps even more 
important, however, FHC credit enhancement might impose standardization on the docu-
ments and due diligence processes in community lending that “could help lenders attract 
secondary market capital and spur dramatic increases in community lending.”
30   U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives, 101 Cong., 2d sess., May 23, 1989.
31   House of Representatives, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6.
32   Nicolas P. Retsinas, “Comment on Kerry D. Vanell’s ‘FHA Restructuring Proposal,’” 
Housing Policy Debate, 6: 2 (1995), 397.
33   Ibid., 405.
34   Ibid., 406.
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ment programs successful, never was authorized. According to Retsinas, he could not get 
the idea past the “partisan gates of Congress.” A critical Price Waterhouse audit of FHA’s 
multifamily loan insurance programs probably also contributed to the resistance in Congress 
to expand a loan insurance strategy at FHA.
2. FHA Risk Share
In some ways, this flurry of activity at the national level was a continuation of exploring 
new ways to fund community development efforts that was an outgrowth of the political 
debates in the 1980s. The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, 
for example, charged the GAO to examine federal credit enhancements. Two years later, 
the GAO outlined four credit-enhancement options and Congress chose to pursue one, the 
FHA risk-sharing demonstration project. The proposed Risk Share program was an effort to 
find ways in which the federal government could put its credit capability behind the efforts 
of state housing finance agencies (HFAs) to bring down the financing cost of affordable 
housing.
The FHA Risk Share program allowed experienced housing finance agencies to use their 
own underwriting standards and documents. The program, which still exists, “provides full 
FHA mortgage insurance to enhance HFA bonds to investment grade. HFAs may elect to 
share from 10 to 90 percent of the loss on a loan with HUD” depending on how much 
they share underwriting responsibility and risk of loss. “Compared with 100 percent credit 
enhancement,  a  partial  federal  credit  enhancement  reduces  the  government’s  risks  and 
potential costs, but generally subjects the loans to be securitized to an evaluation by the 
credit rating agencies or investors (for unrated securities)” according to the GAO. 
3. New GSE Guidelines
The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 revised the 
regulations governing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. One section, entitled “Special Afford-
able Housing Goal,” for the first time specifically required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
purchase affordable multifamily rental housing loans.0
35   Email from Nicolas Retsinas, June 10, 2006.
36   “Community and Economic Development Loans,” 54.
37   GAO, “Housing Finance: Expanding Capital for Affordable Multifamily Housing,” October 1993, 3. 
38   http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfh/progdesc/riskshare542c.cfm.
39   GAO, “Community and Economic Development Loans,” 51.
40   Ibid., 53.
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The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 did 
many positive things for community development finance, including the creation of the 
CDFI Fund. But the proposal to create a GSE for small business loans did not make the 
final cut.
The debate over what became the Riegle Act echoed familiar themes: government-subsi-
dized financing would help the community development network (including banks and 
other for-profit businesses) use the market to improve low-income communities. “[Senator 
Alfonse] D’Amato’s [R-NY] approach favors a market oriented solution and avoids creating 
a massive bureaucracy,” according to William Acworth, a finance reporter for the American 
Banker. He also wrote that the small business loan securitization bill had the backing of 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, but that its prospects were in doubt. Some bankers, 
according to Acworth, said that “small business loans are so different that pooling them into 
a viable security is extremely complex and often impossible. In their own view, the bill is 
simply a political gesture to small business, an important constituency on Capitol Hill.”
The  Clinton  administration  and  community  development  advocates  were  early  and 
aggressive supporters of this bill, as were the real estate and banking industries. Donald Suss-
wein told the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, that “the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America, the National Associations of Realtors, and the National 
Realty Committee would strongly support a bill that would lead to a broad-based commer-
cial secondary mortgage market.”
An important part of the early legislation was the Venture Enhancement and Loan Devel-
opment Administration for Small Undercapitalized Enterprises, or Velda Sue. This agency, 
similar to Fannie Mae in the mortgage market, would buy, securitize, and resell business 
loans to investors.” This proposal, pushed by Rep. John LaFalce (D-NY), did not make it 
into the final bill. 
Merilyn Rovira, vice president of LIMAC, testifying in support of the Riegle Act to the 
House Banking Committee, acknowledged that there was an inherent tension with commu-
nity development small business loans. “Many, if not most, of these loans are small, involve 
substantial technical assistance to borrowers, and have customized structures,” she said. 
However, she continued, in an effort to “expand these kinds of lending efforts and promote 
the revival of healthy market dynamics in distressed communities, nonprofit lenders need to 
move beyond the portfolio lending that is now the norm in the industry and tap into broader 
sources of private funds.”
Rovira went on to point out that one way to solve the problem of connecting low-volume, 
41   William Acworth, “Top Bank Regulators Back Loan Securitization Bill,” American Banker 3:35 (September 20, 
1993), 1.
42   Written statement of Donald B. Susswein, Esq. on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, 
National Association of Realtors, National Realty Committee, Before the Subcommittee on Economic Growth 
and Credit Formation for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 
September 23, 1993.
43   James C. Allen, “Asset Securitization: Borrower’s Market Crimps Business-Loan Securitization Series: 15,” 
American Banker, 160: 12, (January 19, 1995), 24.
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such as LIMAC. “LIMAC’s purpose is to show, with our small but growing track record, that 
these nontraditional community development loans, when properly underwritten, are not 
inherently risky and that they can be securitized,” Rovira said. “The only way to document 
that risks can be taken is to take them.”
The Conference Report on the Riegle Act showed that not everyone got what they 
wanted. The final version of the bill dropped the idea of Velda Sue, the community devel-
opment GSE. As Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) said:
Ironically, one of the other sectors of the economy left without effective access to a 
secondary market under this legislation is community development loans. Testimony 
given during my subcommittee’s hearings clearly outlines the very real need for a 
secondary market for community development loans. 
The bill did create the CDFI Fund and other community development incentives, such as 
the Bank Enterprise Award. 
Tom Ridge (R-PA) did not agree with the Act’s plan to promote CDFIs; he wanted to 
see more incentives for community lending at existing banks. “I have always believed that 
people left behind want to become part of the mainstream again.” He argued, “Do not sepa-
rate us with separate institutions.” Nevertheless, he was supportive of the bill, as were other 
well-known conservatives such as Toby Roth (R-WI), who said, “I will vote for the bill even 
though I have grave reservations about the bill’s provisions that create a new Federal bureau-
cracy to create new subsidized nonbank lending institutions in urban inner-cities,” referring 
to the creation of the CDFI Fund.
By the end of the years’-long process, there was overwhelming support for the Riegle Act 
and it passed 410–12 in the House. It emerged from the conference committee in 1994 to 
become law.
Recent Developments
Since the mid-1990s, many advances have been made in all aspects of this secondary 
market story: early innovators have continued to innovate; certain advances are beginning to 
overcome securitization obstacles (e.g., lack of data); and new programs have been proposed 
at the federal level, some of which involve a greater role for the GSEs. That said, there still 
has not been a breakthrough that allows community development lenders to tap the massive 
pools of capital available from investors. The following is a discussion of these recent devel-
opments.
44   Testimony by Merilyn Rovira, vice president, Local Initiatives Managed Asset Corporation, House Banking, 
Economic Growth and Credit Secondary Market Development Act, October 7, 1993.
45   Conference Report on H.R. 3474, Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 
(House of Representatives—August 4, 1994).
46   Congressional Record,  H6786.
47   Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-325, 108 STAT. 2160).
48   Congressional Record, H6790.
49   Congressional Record, H6788.
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In recent years, there have been rumblings about new programs to create a secondary 
market, but they have not achieved any significant scale. In 1999, for example, HUD Secre-
tary Andrew Cuomo proposed the creation of an expanded market for CDBG loans. Lauding 
the efficiencies in the single-family finance market, the Secretary said, “We don’t have that 
in economic development (loans). If we did, it would be a fundamentally different system, 
and that’s where we’re trying to go.” HUD already had experience with selling Section 108 
economic development loans into the secondary market. “The thin edge of the wedge in 
the crack in the wall is there,” Cuomo said. “It’s a daunting undertaking, but there is some 
precedent.” That program never got off the ground, however.0
A potentially more promising program from the federal government is one where the 
U.S. Department of Education is providing grants for credit-enhancing charter school loans. 
The Charter Schools Facilities Financing Demonstration Program has already scored some 
successful securitizations through groups such as The Reinvestment Fund (TRF), NCB, and 
the Low-Income Investment Fund. LIIF received a $3 million grant in the first round of 
this program and is using it “as loan loss reserve funds to leverage $64 million in private 
capital that LIIF and its partners are actively raising for further financing of charter school 
facilities.” Nancy Andrews, president and CEO of the Low Income Investment Fund, said, 
“With this grant capitalizing a loan loss reserve, we are now leveraging investments . . . from 
Citibank, Wells Fargo, Prudential, and other mainstream investment houses.”
There is also some interest in making a greater commitment to affordable housing part of 
the GSE reform legislation, which is currently being debated in Congress. One such proposal 
last year, the Reed Amendment, proposed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set aside 5 
percent of their profit to provide production grants in addition to credit enhancements for 
securitizing affordable housing mortgages. Nancy Andrews explained to the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs committee how this program might work. “The GSE would agree 
in advance to buy, say, $100 million of these loans and would establish a special loss reserve 
pool or ‘credit enhancement’ from the GSE Underserved Market Fund,” she said. The “GSE 
would then pool these funds into a mortgage-backed security and provide credit enhance-
ment that would confer its AAA bond rating on the pooled security. This security could then 
be sold in the capital markets.”
The  final  pieces  in  this  evolving  story  include  innovation  in  solving  some  of  the 
continuing problems of generating enough data to make adequate risk/reward pricing deci-
sions, along with exciting breakthroughs by CRF in creating a rated community develop-
ment security. Both of these developments are described below, followed by a description of 
recent secondary market innovations by the insurance industry and credit unions.
50   Ed Staples, “HUD Plans CDBG Secondary Market,” Mortgage-Backed Securities Letter 14:6 (February 8, 1999), 1.
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As Alan Greenspan noted at the 2005 National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
Conference, the lack of reliable data is one of the industry’s major handicaps, particularly as 
it migrates to using “new sources of equity—community development venture capital funds 
and secondary markets that securitize community development loan pools.” Greenspan 
praised a number of efforts currently under way, including: (1) CDFI Fund’s Community 
Investment Impact System, which collects standardized data on customers, transactions, and 
markets that use the New Markets Tax Credit program; (2) the Neighborhood Reinvestment 
Corporation’s new data system that defines and measures the impact of community devel-
opment programs; and (3) the Opportunity Finance Network’s (OFN) “CDFI Assessment 
and Rating System” or CARS. “By consistently and reliably measuring outcomes, and thus 
helping current and prospective investors better assess their risks and predict their returns, 
community development organizations can attract more funding. Such accountability is 
crucial for any organization, regardless of size,” he said.
CARS is an important effort to try to standardize how CDFIs collect and report data. 
“Some CDFIs are actively trying to access the capital markets and have explored the possi-
bility of obtaining a rating from a Wall Street firm,” according to OFN. “While a CARS 
rating is not a Wall Street rating, the CARS process, over the long run, can help the rating 
agencies understand CDFIs and help CDFIs prepare for an eventual Wall Street rating or 
other transaction with the financial markets.”
Another recent breakthrough that might help clear the fog for investors interested in 
community development loans is a new small business portfolio model from Standard and 
Poor’s. The model uses “a Monte Carlo–based algorithm that assesses loan portfolio default 
outcomes under various stress scenarios,” according to a press release. Using data from the 
SBA 7(a) program, and “after accounting for business sector and geographic correlation, one 
can generate statistically stable simulations of loan portfolio default outcomes.” The model 
is designed for portfolios and not individual loans. The database has twenty years of history 
on 10,000 lenders with 650,000 small business loans.
Perhaps  the  most  exciting  recent  development  proving  the  viability  of  securitizing 
community development loans is the issuance of rated securities by CRF in 2004 and 2006. 
Previously CRF had been able to place privately hundreds of millions of dollars in commu-
nity development loans, but by having its security rated by Standard and Poor’s, it was 
able to attract new investors. For example, in CRF 17, issued in November 2004, the “first 
three tranches were rated AAA, which enabled eight new institutional investors with strict 
investing guidelines, including Northwest Mutual Life, to buy into the deal,” as reported in 
an article in Investment Dealers Digest.
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pool where no one loan is much bigger than the others; they prefer a pool of similarly sized 
loans (sometimes referred to as granularity). And there is a push to make sure that the pools 
are diversified geographically (though many bank investors are more interested in buying 
into pools with projects in their CRA assessment areas). 
 In May 2006, CRF rolled out its second rated security, CRF 18. According to Standard 
and Poor’s Pre-Sale document
The ratings assigned to CRF-18 LLC’s $47.59 million CRF USA community reinvest-
ment revenue notes series 18 reflect the credit enhancement consisting of overcollat-
eralization, subordination, an interest reserve account, and excess spread. The ratings 
are also based on CRF’s demonstrated servicing ability. This securitization is a pool of 
small business development loans that are not insured or guaranteed by any govern-
mental agency. 
The Center for Community Self Help in North Carolina also has been generating a track 
record of performance with community development loans with Fannie Mae through its 
Community Advantage Secondary Market Loan Program. Self Help buys affordable mort-
gages and sells them to Fannie Mae, but with full recourse. A grant from the Ford Founda-
tion helps underwrite a considerable amount of the financial risk for Self Help.
The Center for Community Capitalism at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill has been studying the performance of these loans, which “could not otherwise be readily 
sold in the secondary market because of their perceived higher risks.” These loans have:
flexible underwriting and typically include one or more of the following features: low 
or no down payment, higher debt-to-income ratios, approval of borrowers with spotty 
credit records or no established credit, and waivers of private mortgage insurance and 
the usual requirement that a borrower have at least two months of loan payments avail-
able as a cash reserve at the time of closing. 
There also have been developments in the secondary market by both the insurance 
industry and credit unions, which seem to be driven by the desire to show that they are doing 
innovative work around community development without the stick of CRA-like legislation 
for their industries. The insurance industry launched Impact Community Capital (Impact), 
which has been providing capital to community development lenders (for a more complete 
discussion of a transaction with Impact as purchaser, see George Vine’s article in this issue). 
The  National  Federation  of  Community  Development  Credit  Unions  launched  its 
secondary market program with a purchase of single-family mortgages that were originated 
by Self Help for recent immigrants at the end of 2005. The loans use Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Numbers (ITINs) rather than social security numbers. Federation Executive 
Director Cliff Rosenthal said the Federation plans to purchase other loans, including co-op 
loans and manufactured housing mortgages. “The goal of the CDCU Secondary Market is 
57  http://www2.standardandpoors.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=sp/sp_article/ArticleTemplate&c=sp_article
&cid=1145743573642&s=&ig=&b=2&dct=19.
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them, and then resell them when and where appropriate,” according to Terri J. Fowlkes, the 
recently appointed director of the CDCU Mortgage Center.
Conclusion
The possibility of a fully functioning secondary market for community development 
loans holds the promise of dramatically increasing the flow of cheaper capital to struggling 
low-income communities. Over the last twenty-five years, that promise has been realized at 
points in time and in fits and starts. But the overall goal remains elusive. It is not clear what 
program, policy, or product might break the bottleneck and help bring about this market. 
In the meantime, however, creative and talented community development financial prac-
titioners will continue to lay the groundwork—collect the data, prove the concept, build 
new models—in order to find ways to more fully engage the capital markets in community 
development.
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